The Postwar Security Crisis, 2021–2023
74. The Fragility of the Ceasefire
The November 2020 agreement stopped large-scale fighting but did not establish stable peace.
Disputes continued over prisoners, military positions, transport routes, border demarcation, and the implementation of the ceasefire.
Incidents occurred along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border and within the former conflict zone.
The absence of a comprehensive peace treaty left major security questions unresolved.
75. The Border Confrontations of 2021
In May 2021, Armenian authorities reported Azerbaijani military incursions into areas of Armenia's Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces.
Azerbaijan disputed Armenia's characterization and argued that the movements concerned contested border positions in areas lacking completed delimitation.
Further clashes occurred during the year.
The confrontations demonstrated that the 2020 war had not resolved the broader dispute over borders and security.
They also raised concerns about the possibility of renewed interstate warfare.
76. The September 2022 Fighting
In September 2022, major fighting erupted along several sections of the internationally recognized Armenia–Azerbaijan border.
The clashes caused substantial military casualties.
Armenia accused Azerbaijan of attacking its sovereign territory.
Azerbaijan argued that its forces were responding to Armenian military provocations.
The confrontation demonstrated that the conflict could expand beyond Nagorno-Karabakh.
It also placed further pressure on Armenia's security institutions and international partnerships.
77. The Lachin Corridor Crisis
Beginning in December 2022, movement along the Lachin Corridor was severely disrupted.
Individuals presenting themselves as Azerbaijani environmental activists blocked the road, protesting alleged mining activity.
Armenian authorities argued that the protests were supported or orchestrated by Azerbaijan and constituted a blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population.
Azerbaijan rejected the blockade characterization and asserted that the protests concerned environmental issues.
The disruption affected food supplies, medicine, fuel, travel, and medical evacuation.
In February 2023, the International Court of Justice ordered Azerbaijan to take measures within its power to ensure unimpeded movement along the corridor.
Azerbaijan subsequently established a checkpoint on the route in April 2023.
The humanitarian situation deteriorated further during the following months.
78. The Humanitarian Emergency
By the summer of 2023, Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh faced serious shortages.
Reports described difficulties obtaining food, medicine, fuel, and essential household supplies.
Hospitals and medical personnel struggled with limited resources.
Restrictions on transportation also affected education, employment, agriculture, and family life.
The situation deepened fears among Armenians that their communities could not remain secure without reliable international protection.
The crisis demonstrated the vulnerability of a population dependent on a single principal transport connection.
79. The September 2023 Azerbaijani Offensive
On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a new military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan described the operation as an anti-terrorist measure intended to disarm Armenian armed formations and restore full constitutional control over the region.
The operation involved artillery, military advances, and strikes against Armenian positions.
The local Armenian forces were unable to sustain prolonged resistance.
A ceasefire was reached the following day.
The self-declared Artsakh authorities agreed to disarm their forces.
Azerbaijan established effective control over the remaining Armenian-administered territory.
This marked the end of the territorial arrangement created by the 2020 ceasefire.
80. The Mass Exodus of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian Population
Following the September 2023 offensive, more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia.
The movement occurred over approximately one week.
Families traveled through the Lachin route, often in long lines of vehicles.
Many carried only limited possessions.
The exodus included children, older people, people with disabilities, and families who had already experienced displacement during earlier conflicts.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees documented the arrival of more than 100,000 refugees and coordinated humanitarian assistance in Armenia.
Armenia characterized the displacement as ethnic cleansing.
Azerbaijan rejected that characterization, stating that Armenian residents had been offered the possibility of remaining under Azerbaijani administration.
Human rights organizations documented the atmosphere of fear, the preceding humanitarian crisis, and the circumstances that led many residents to believe they could not safely remain.
The legal characterization of the events remains a matter of international dispute and requires careful distinction from judicial findings.
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
81. The End of the Self-Declared Republic of Artsakh's Territorial Administration
After the September 2023 offensive, the self-declared Republic of Artsakh lost control of the territory it had administered.
Its president announced the dissolution of the republic's institutions, although subsequent political and legal disputes arose over the validity and implications of that decision.
Azerbaijan consolidated control over Nagorno-Karabakh.
The overwhelming majority of the Armenian population had departed.
For Armenians, the development represented the effective end of a decades-long effort to maintain autonomous Armenian political institutions in Artsakh.
For Azerbaijan, it represented the restoration of state authority over the entire internationally recognized territory of the country.
The question of the displaced Armenian population's rights, property, cultural heritage, and possible return remained unresolved.